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Abstract 
This paper surveys issues around several grand challenge problems for the understanding of the 
emergence 
and evolution linguistic communication, and discusses possible approaches. The identi_ed 
problems 
the emergence of (1) advanced use of deixis, gesture, and reference; (2) predication; (3) 
negation; 
(4) syntactic categories; and (5) compositionality. 
1 Introduction 
In the last decade or so, there has been an explosion 
of interest in the modelling and understanding 
of language origins. The employment of simulation 
and robotic agent-based, connectionist neural 
network, and evolutionary techniques has provided 
new methods for formulating hypotheses, validating 
mechanisms, and selecting between alternative theories 
on the emergence of linguistic and languagelike 
phenomena in controlled experimental settings 
that meet the scienti_c criteria of reproducibility. Recent 
work on the emergence and evolution of human 
language and more simple communication systems 
has been increasingly interdisciplinary, involving collaborations 
between linguists, philosophers, biologists, 
cognitive scientists, roboticists, mathematical 
and computational modellers . see e.g. research papers 
(MacLennan, 1992; Steels, 1995; Hashimoto and 
Ikegami, 1995; Arita and Koyama, 1998; Billard and 
Dautenhahn, 1999; Kirby, 1999; Nehaniv, 2000; Cangelosi, 
2001; Steels, 2003) and interdisciplinary collections 
(Wray, 2002; Cangelosi and Parisi, 2002; 
Christiansen and Kirby, 2003). 
This paper surveys some currently open problems 
in the emergence and evolution of linguistic communication 
that present grand challenges to those working 
in constructive aspects of the emergence of communication. 
In this paper, we address the programme 
of demonstrating mechanisms that achieve various 
language-like properties in computational agent and 
robotic models. This is not intended to be an exhaustive 
survey. Many important research articles and researchers 
could not be mentoned here. The discussion 
is instead indicative of current research activity 
(and inactivity) as regards a set of fundamental problems 
in the area. 
We will discuss the following completely or 
largely open areas: 
(1) deixis, gesture, and reference; 
(2) predication; 
(3) negation; 
(4) emergence of syntactic categories 
(5) compositionality 
The emergence and modelling of these phenomena 
are discussed in the context of embodied, social interaction 
and evolution (cultural or otherwise). Ideally, 
mechanisms based on sensorimotor and experiential 
grounding in bottom-up, agent-centered models involving 
populations of agents will help yield deep understanding 
of the emergence of the above phenomena. 
One area is conspicuously missing from the above 
list: 
(0) grounding and shared vocabularies 
and will also be discussed brie_y below. This area 
has not been included in the list of current grand 
challenges since there has been substantial progress 
in it. However grounding and shared vocabularies 
will need to be integrated with the answers to 
the grand challenge problem areas (1-5) to yield 
86 
grounded and shared language-like communication 
systems with much more complex types of vocabulary 
with grounded meaning than what has been so 
far achieved. 
2 What is Meaning and What is 
Language For? 
We regard linguistic and language-like communication 
as the capacity of an agent to in_uence the world 
around by the systematic use of signals mediated by 
their reception by other agents in its environment. 
Thus, language is regarded as a means for the agent 
to `manipulate' the world around for its own bene_t, 
similar to other traits of biological organisms (cf. the 
discussion of the transition to language from a biological 
viewpoint in (Maynard Smith and Szathm´ary, 
1995)). As Wittgenstein (1968) taught us, the meaning 
of any signalling behaviour, such as in language, 
arises in how it is used by the agent to manipulate 
its environment (including other agents) in its interactions 
with other agents. This can be related to the utility 
to an agent (in a statistical sense) of information 
in a signalling channel (see Nehaniv (1999); Nehaniv 
et al. (1999, 2002)). According the insights of Peirce 
(1839-1914) [republished in (Peirce, 1995)], the relationship 
between signs and signi_cations is mediated 
by an interpretant, and the mapping between signs 
and what they signify is a process that depends on 
the particular agents involved and on their situated 
contexts. The ideas just presented follow the discussion 
of Nehaniv (1999, 2000). The Wittgensteinian- 
Peircian viewpoint outlined by Parisi et al. (2002) is 
similar. 
In particular, these realizations lead a tremendous 
amount freedom in the emergence of language-like 
phenomena that has often been ignored and oversimpli 
_ed by naively, often unconsciously, applying 
constraints on simulation models. This freedom and 
the related lack of constraints is illustrated by several 
corollaries. Understanding the emergence of meaning 
and language requires the generative synthesis of the 
phenomena in question beginning with the following 
facts: 
1. Meaning is always agent-speci_c. 
2. There is no privileged set of pre-existing space 
of possible meaning, containing ideal concepts. 
3. There is no unique and no pre-existing syntactic 
structure on possible meanings. 
4. If meanings, spaces of meaning, or syntax in 
meaning space do arise, they will be agentspeci 
_c as well. 
5. The mappings between signs and meaning are 
mediated by interpreted signals between agents, 
and these mappings are also agent-speci_c and 
depend on the context of the interaction. 
See (Nehaniv, 1999, 2000) for further discussion of 
these points. 
Note that none of the above discussion refers to 
truth values or truth conditions, which are highly derived 
properties of human linguistic behaviour (Nehaniv, 
2000), and that therefore should not be the 
starting point for an attempt to understand meaning, 
communication, and language. The highly re_ned 
formal tools mathematics and logic . including truth 
values, predicate logic, context-free grammars, denotational 
semantics, etc. . have allowed scientists 
achieve precision and thus escape from ambiguities 
and dependence on context and speci_c agents. But 
speci_c agents and context are inherent to the emergence 
of language, while these tools are based on 
abstractions and re_nements from human language. 
Any explanation of the emergence of language that 
uses them as primitives to derive the phenomena that 
they are based on thus puts the proverbial cart before 
the horse (Nehaniv, 2000; Milikan, 2004). 
This is not to say that these tools and formalisms 
should never be used. In computational modelling 
this is clearly would not be possible, simply due 
to the use of computers. No simulation or robotic 
study in the emergence and evolution of linguistic 
communication has been able to proceed successfully 
without simplifying some (or sometimes all) of the 
above complexity away. If agents are endowed with 
some of these language-like capacities, it is important 
to keep track of which ones. If new phenomena 
then emerge, one has an argument that the builtin 
capacities provide scaffolding for the new phenomena. 
For instance, the work of Kirby (1999) 
shows that, in populations of agents with the capacity 
to use and derive context-free grammars, processes 
of self-organization resulting from attempts to learn 
grammar based on induction from the evidence of 
grammar-generated utterances of other agents lead 
over generations to increasingly compositional grammars. 
His work does not how it is that context-free 
grammars nor the capacity for compositionality could 
_rst emerge (since these are given at the start). 
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3 Symbol Grounding & Shared 
Vocabularies 
Different aspects of symbol grounding (Harnad, 
1990) and the self-organization and maintenance of 
shared vocabularies are increasingly well-studied 
and coming to be understood, especially for vocabularies 
to identify or name objects (selecting one target 
of reference from an environment) or label situations 
(MacLennan, 1992; Steels, 1995, 1998; Billard and 
Dautenhahn, 1999; Baillie and Nehaniv, 2001; Parisi 
et al., 2002). Less work has been done on the grounding 
of shared vocabularies with more complexity, e.g. 
in which various parts of speech exist (labelling for 
example actions or actions on objects, or with compositional 
syntax), although the work of Cangelosi and 
collaborators has moved in this direction (e.g. Parisi 
et al. (2002)). 
4 From Deixis, Gesture, and Manipulation 
to Reference 
The items, deixis and gesture, in challenge area (1) 
are clearly related and emergence of reference. Reference 
is often suggested to be grounded in deixis and 
gesture but just how this occurs needs elucidation. 
Pointing, deictic gaze, joint attention, and gesture 
play important roles in the development of intersubjectivity 
and language in humans (cf. Kita (2003)). 
Pointing, since it can be directed at many things 
and since it directs others' attention at them, could 
have provided for a kind .ur-pronominalization. in 
the emergence of linguistic communication. That is, 
pointing provides for a variable or variables that can 
be bound to object and persons in the environment, 
giving at least of degree shared reference via shared 
attention. 
Rizzolatti and Arbib (1998) present a hypothesis 
on the emergence of language based on mirrorneurons 
in primates and humans. These neurons in 
the premotor cortex _re both when carrying out and 
when seeing an action performed. It is argued that 
this provides a substrate on which shared meaning 
can arise, as similar affordant gestures (e.g. manipulations 
such as grasping a fruit) are immediately understood 
by a conspeci_c interaction partner. Gestural 
language is then hypothesized to have developed 
and eventually to have given way to vocal language. 
Hurford (2004) acknowledges a possible role for mirror 
neurons in understanding the possible emergence 
of language, but surveys many gaps that remain in 
such an explanation, such as explaining the wellknown 
arbitrariness of the sign in regard to its reference. 
Milikan (2004) has a more general notion of reference 
that relates to utility of information in internal 
states or signalling channels. A more general notion 
of gesture regards gesture as the signalling of such 
useful information. This is similar to the viewpoints 
on the meaning of signals in (Nehaniv, 1999, 2000; 
Wittgenstein, 1968). 
The issues discussed in this section evidently relate 
closely to the grounding of symbols and the emergence 
of shared systems of communication. Despite 
progress in these areas, constructive studies linking 
deixis and gesture to these problem areas remain to be 
carried out constructively in robotic and simulation 
models (but see Baillie and Nehaniv (2001); Baillie 
et al. (2004) for some _rst work in this direction). 
5 Predication 
For detailed analysis of predication and its complex 
structure in human language from the viewpoint of 
linguistics, see (Napoli, 1989). In human language, 
a rudimentary function of noun phrases is to pick out 
objects of reference from the environment (possibly 
even absent ones). Adjectives constrain the selection 
by imposing conditions on which object might be referred 
to. 
One formal view of reference (implicit e.g. in 
(Steels, this volume) and classical box-world natural 
language processing systems) is that instances of 
lexical items such as a noun (.ball.) or adjective 
(.red.) are understood as predicating properties of 
object variables. Selection of referents is determined 
by solving constraints on such predicates over a space 
of objects in the environment. For example, ball(X) 
and red(Y ), restricts the reference to a red ball if 
X must equal Y , as it must in the phrase .the red 
ball.. Similarly verbs provide another class of predicates 
which might take multiple semantic role arguments 
expressed in a given syntactic subcategorization 
frame that resolves variable references (Steels, 
this volume). 
As mentioned above, predicate logic and _rstorder 
logic are abstractions from the predicate 
structure of natural language. With the approach 
just described, predication itself is a primitive and 
therefore does not emerge. However, a transition 
from reference to predication is suggested by an 
association that tends to identify referential variables 
in one-place referential predicates (like red(X)), or 
by grammatical rules that force the identi_cation of 
variables in the referential predicates. 
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Scenario for the Emergence of Predication. 
Early on proto-words or gestural signs could have 
their referents associated in a general way, nonspeci 
_c way merely by co-occurring close together 
in time. We elaborate a suggestion on the earliest 
source of predication: it may be a highly derived form 
of topic-comment structure, which is itself founded 
on association (Nehaniv, 2000). For instance, deictic 
gesture serves to select a target of joint attention 
(topic), and then another gesture or utterance near 
to it in time serves to communicate content that was 
associated to the topic as comment. Eventually ritualization 
of such communicative practice produces 
gramaticalization of a topic-comment construction. 
Predication then arises via grammaticalizaton of the 
special case in which not only an association between 
topic and comment occurs, but the comment gives 
to the topic a labelling category: .This - food., a 
property label .This . bad., or a semantic actionrole 
.This . eat.. Thus there is a progression in 
the emergence of predication from association and 
topic-comment via ritualization to grammaticalizaton 
of predication. 
Ritualization is well-known in animal communication 
systems (Smith, 1977, 1996; Bradbury and 
Vehrencamp, 1998) and one instance of it is grammaticalization, 
a well-recognized process in human language 
change (e.g. (Bybee et al., 1994)). A clear path 
for research into this open area would be to proceed to 
validate this proposed scenario by building computational 
or robotic realization and showing whether and 
how the transitions 
association ! topic-comment ! predication 
could occur (ideally including grounded referencing). 
This should shed light on the details of the emergence 
of predication and the mechanisms required for this to 
occur. 
If this could be done, more complex predication 
and modi_cation could then be addressed. In more 
complex human language, both predicates and modifers 
occur. Predicates tend to mark more highly 
salient assertions, while modi_ers tend to act in the 
background to tune reference via constraints (Nehaniv, 
1987). 
Let us again remark about the at best low relevance 
of truth values here. In early language as in 
animal communication system, the emphasis was of 
course manipulation of and in_uence in the environment 
via signalling to others (cf. Maynard Smith and 
Szathm´ary (1995); Milikan (2004); Nehaniv et al. 
(2002)), rather than on propositional assertions. Truth 
values of predicates on objects was only a later invention 
and abstraction of humans. 
6 Negation: A Small Research 
Programme 
It seems little has been done in emergence of negation 
in constructive evolution of language models. 
A discussion of negation of speach acts and within 
speech acts occurs in (Searle, 1980/1969). A comprehensive 
book on negation is (Horn, 2001). 
Early Scenarios for Negation. 
(The material in this subsection is modi_ed from text 
by Donna Jo Napoli (Napoli, pers. comm.).) Early 
predicates used by early humans likely indicated actions 
such as .come., .hide., .be quiet., .run., or 
referenced objects, such as .food., .water.. Negation 
can operate on nouns as well as on verbs, or 
other parts of speech, and is, of course, a predicate 
in itself.1 Letting others know there is nothing in the 
cave, for example, was probably a pretty important 
early message. So one would expect .nothing. or .no 
living thing. to be an early negation. 
Non-verbal, facial and manual gestures may have 
played an important role in early negation. When 
hunting, when trying to be quiet for any reason, 
people have always used their faces and hands. We 
all recognize the hush gesture. We know to raise 
our eyebrows to ask yes/no. This sort of thing is 
extremely common around the world. In Australia, 
many tribes used to have sign languages just for 
hunting. (They had sign languages for other things, 
too . like to use with widows . and for the deaf). 
The _rst negation was likely either facial or gestural 
. perhaps a head shake or lowered brows (as in 
American Sign Language (Neidle et al., 2001)), 
or protruded lips. Also, early negation was likely 
simultaneous with whatever was being negated, 
whether spoken words or other gestures. So shake 
your head and say .buffalo. - or shake you head 
and say .swim/enter water. or shake your head 
and gesture .walk (whatever that gesture might be 
for those peoples) . and you're getting across the 
messages .there are no buffaloes. . .don't go in the 
water. . .don't walk.. (Scenario and examples due 
to Napoli (pers. comm.). The author is responsible 
for any misrepresenations of her views.) 
1Or a modi_er, where modi_cation is plays a role, e.g. a specifying 
a constraint on reference within consituent syntactic structure, 
and is generaly less marked than predication. 
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Computational Scenarios for Emergence of Negation. 
We now give several ideas for constructivist approaches 
to negation: 
1. It seems straight forward to use inhibition in 
arti_cial neural networks to suppress the behaviour in 
the presence of a negation signal N. Suppression of 
all action could yield compliance (by inaction) with 
commands such as .don't touch that.. This could be 
realized to many existing models. 
2. A research scenario into the use of more 
speci_c negation could employ connectionist neural 
network models of agents using linguistic signalling 
such as those of Cangelosi (2001), which 
can have a noun-verb distinction (see below) that 
they exhibit in language games. We propose that 
these be extended by the introduction of tasks into 
the language games that sometimes involve negation: 
When the new signal N co-occurs with 
a previously learned linguistic signal S the language 
game task requires choosing a different object/ 
property (.(proto)noun./.(proto)adjective.) or 
action (.(proto)verb.), respectively, than would be 
for the signal S. Tasks without the signalN must also 
be carried out by the agents and require the original 
interpretation of S. That is, the agents could carry 
commands such as .pull cup., .not-pull [e.g. push] 
cup., .pull not-cup. (i.e. pull an object other than the 
cup), , or even .not-pull not-cup. (e.g. pushing a ball 
would be a correct response). The meaning of the 
negation signalN would be grounded in the language 
game tasks these agents have to perform. Demonstrating 
that evolving populations of neural network 
agents could learn this task would establish a connectionist 
basis for speci_c negation of constituents of 
simple linguistic utterances. Alternatively, one could 
do the same kind of study using agents such as in the 
work of Steels (2003). 
3. We note that in many human sign languages 
such as American Sign Language (ASL), the scope 
of negation can be given over syntactic subunits by 
non-manual gestures. In ASL non-manual marking 
(furrowing of the eyebrows and side-to-side headshake) 
may spread over the (c-command) domain of 
constituent syntactic node, and moreover such spread 
is obligatory in the absence of manual marker (Neidle 
et al., 2001). (This property agrees well with the 
likely simultaneity in the early negation described in 
Napoli's scenario above.) Thus in constructivist studies 
of the emergence of language, it would be very 
interesting to investigate scope of negation. For example, 
in neural network agent models, the use of 
a negative signal would have presumably to involve 
the persistence in the network of internal state over 
the scope of the negated constituent. Synthetic neural 
imaging techniques like those of Cangelosi and Parisi 
(2004) could be useful here. 
7 Syntactic Categories 
In arti_cial neural network connectionist models, 
Parisi et al. (2002) have shown the grounded emergence 
of rudimentary nouns and verbs: Nouns, as 
linguistic signals that co-vary with sensory stimuli, 
and verbs, as linguistic signals that co-vary 
with actions (largely independent of sensory stimuli). 
They have suggested that this could be extended to 
(proto)adjectives, that select a referent within a noun 
category using some intrinsic property, and to nonadjectival 
modi_ers, such as location indicators (e.g. 
left, right, above), that re_ect more temporary properties 
of objects which are not instrinsic to the object 
but depend on the relationship of object to speakers 
and the environment. This remains to be done, as 
does increasing the complexity of syntactic categories 
the approach can generate (e.g. to verbs with a patient 
and recipient role, as .give the apple to Mary.. 
Steels (this volume) also considers the emergence 
of shared semantic and syntactic frames based on 
grammaticalization driven by computational needs of 
disambiguation. 
This issue of emergence of syntactic categories, 
which are restricted in the types of semantic environments 
where they can occur (as in the work of Parisi 
et al. (2002)), and in their signal contexts, and in the 
types of arguments they can take (if any), leads to the 
next grand challenge, the achievement of full-blown 
compositional syntax in a grounded communication 
system. 
8 Compositionality 
The emergence of lexical items that take arguments 
(such as transitive verbs that take an noun-phrase as 
object) is called compositionality. This has syntactic 
and semantic aspects, and accounts for much of 
the combinatorial richness of human language. There 
have also been a growing number of studies on the 
emergence of various aspects of syntax (e.g. (Kirby, 
1999; Cangelosi, 2001; Steels, this volume)). While 
there has also been some pioneering work on syntactic 
categories (e.g. Cangelosi and Parisi (2004); Parisi 
et al. (2002)), and grounded compositionality (Steels, 
1998), many aspects of compositionality in linguistic 
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communication remain completely open for constructive 
modellers to begin to explain. 
Segmentation and pauses in modern human 
speech, e.g. arising from the need to breath or the 
temporal nature of cognitive processes, combined 
with local context have been shown informationtheoretically 
to improve the disambiguation of 
speech, suggesting that sequential process of smaller 
sequential units may help provide the basis for syntax 
in language evolution and language processing Lyon 
et al. (2003). 
Cangelosi (2001) showed the emergence of verbs 
for actions that take target objects references in neural 
network agents that can manipulate simple objects 
in the environment in an evolutionary simulation, but 
non-compositional communicative signals could also 
evolve. 
Assuming a _xed and syntactically structured 
meaning space, and a capacity to use and learn 
context-free grammars, Kirby (1999, 2001), as mentioned 
above, has shown that grammars with high degrees 
of compositionality arise and are easier to transmit 
over the course of generations of learning in such 
agents starting from agents using non-compositional 
`holistic' grammars (i.e. with a different utterance for 
each meaning). Extending this work to agent-centred 
spaces of meaning grounded in interaction and language 
games remains to be achieved. 
Steels (this volume) argues that the purpose of 
compositional grammar is to reduce the number of 
variables in a decoded meaning structure in order 
to hope with compuational complexity in interpretation. 
He constructs agents in simulation studies 
that apply this principle and are able to converge 
on shared grammars by reinforcing and modifying 
syntatic and semantic role-structural frames (to propogate 
referental constraints) based on communicative 
success and failure. The same structures are used 
for parsing and for production. 
Recursive composition structure is possible if the 
expansion of argument can non-trivially include the 
same argument type (as with clauses embedded in 
other clauses). When this occurs, in principal the language 
becomes unbounded in size. 
9 Conclusions 
Our list of grand challenge areas identi_ed _ve challenges 
beyond symbol grounding and the emergence 
of shared systems of communicating meaning: (1) 
the role of deixis, gesture, and manipulation in the 
grounding and emergence of reference, (2) predication, 
(3) negation, (4) syntactic categories, and (5) full 
syntax - compositionality and recursive structure. 
Challenges (2), on predication, and (3), on negation, 
have been the most neglected by the evolution 
of language community. We hope this paper stimulates 
discussion on these issues and promote research 
especially into those areas. 
The problem of predication (2) is argued to be related 
to associative processes and to topic-comment 
structures, as precursors. Predicates as the exist today 
in human languages are seen as a highly derived 
special case of related processes. 
Computational scenarios for studying the emergence 
of predication and of negation have been proposed 
and discussed in order to encourage the investigation 
into their hemergence. 
Other immediate work to be done to meet these 
grand challenges includes: (4) emergence of syntactic 
categories needs to be shown without assuming 
an underlying categorization on some pre-existing 
space of meanings in grounded language games. (5) 
compositionality (and recursion) needs to be shown 
to emerge in a setting of grounded meaning without 
the assumption of an underlying grammatical ability, 
such as the capacity to learn and use context-free 
grammars. 
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